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WHOSE RIGHTS ARE THEY ANYWAY? SOLVING THE
PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTIONS OF
AUTHORITY IN THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
JOHN L. SASSO*

ABSTRACT
The lack of a clear and consistent federal standard across the
country harms both airline carriers and aviation employees—
carriers who grapple with a myriad of regulations and airline
employees who are unsure of their rights and how to exercise
them. As states with expansive labor laws continue to assert extraterritorial authority to enforce their laws on airline workers
who may only temporarily pass through their borders, the confusing thicket of conflicting state and federal laws only worsens.
There is a clear need for an updated federal framework that
takes into account the airline industry and the needs of workers
in the present day; while the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA)
may have served its purpose in stabilizing the nascent airline industry in the 1930s, the aviation industry has outgrown its usefulness. To replace the RLA and standardize the labor rights of
workers in the aviation industry, this Comment proposes amending Title 49 of the U.S. Code (Title 49) to include a chapter on
labor. Because of the direct impact of the labor rights of airline
workers on the safety of the aviation industry, legislation dealing
with these rights falls squarely within the purview of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Through the proposed amendment, the aviation industry will be made safer, workers will receive greater protections, and the squandering of judicial
economy through needless litigation over the thicket of conflicting local, state, and federal law will cease.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021; B.S., Economics, Texas
A&M University, 2018. Thank you to my parents, Matt and Susan, for their
relentless encouragement and support in all that I do.
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I. INTRODUCTION
OR MOST EMPLOYEES, the question “Where do I work?” is
not one that ever comes to mind. But for some workers, particularly those in the airline industry, a thicket of conflicting local, state, and federal laws, along with work that regularly takes
them across state lines, raises serious questions about where exactly the work is being performed—and more importantly, what
rights and protections apply. While workers can be certain that
some federal laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA) or Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) apply to them no
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matter where they work in the country, the applicability of state
and local labor laws that provide additional protections like California’s wage and hour laws or New York City’s paid sick leave
law is much less certain. This confusion has only been magnified
by some states’ recent assertions of extraterritorial authority to
apply their wage and hour laws to workers located outside of
their borders. In light of this uncertainty and the growing number of cases stemming from it, there exists a clear need for legislative intervention to preempt conflicting state and local labor
laws and to bring uniformity to the field.
Part II of this Comment provides the historical background of
federal wage and labor law, with a particular focus on how it has
developed for workers in the railway industry, and how that history shaped the field of airline labor law. Part III examines the
current state of the conflicting federal, state, and local laws, the
recent cases arising out of such conflict, and the assertions of
extraterritorial authority. Part IV advocates for nationwide uniformity in labor law for aviation workers, divorcing the labor
rights of airline workers from the RLA, and outlines the policy
implications of letting the current thicket of conflicting laws
worsen. Part V proposes an amendment to Title 49 of the U.S.
Code (Title 49) that would grant the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the authority to regulate the labor of airline workers and establish a comprehensive framework of labor and wage
laws that will preempt state and local regulations.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Though the development of labor law in the United States has
a long and storied history dating back to the slave trade, the
modern statutory framework finds its roots in several critical
pieces of legislation in the early twentieth century. Prior to the
passage of these seminal pieces of legislation, courts around the
country were striking down protections for workers as unconstitutional, including laws limiting the number of hours an employee could work in 1905,1 prohibiting conditioning
employment on an agreement to not join a union in 1915,2
prohibiting child labor in 1918,3 and establishing minimum
wage standards for women and children in 1923.4 Subsequent
1
2
3
4

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923).
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acts like the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)5 and
the FLSA6 were radical grants of rights and protections to employees in a legal environment that had previously been inimical
to them. These two acts built on the foundations of others like
the RLA,7 which provided much needed protections only to
workers in certain industries—that is, the railroad industry, and
later, airline industry. These acts, and the subsequent court decisions upholding them, signaled a sea change in American jurisprudence toward protecting the rights of workers and, to this
day, serve as the foundation of labor law in the United States.
A.

FOUNDATIONS OF AIRLINE WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE INHERITED HISTORY OF RAILWAY
WORKERS’ COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

One of the first instances of collective bargaining and its subsequent suppression by the judiciary came out of Pennsylvania
in the late 1700s. There, a group of shoemakers formed a protounion to respond to the increasing labor hardships of an industrializing society and to secure fair wages for its members.8 This
union, however, did not have a long lifespan, and after just ten
years, a suit was brought against members of the union for the
criminal charge of conspiracy in Commonwealth v. Pullis.9 Eight
of the union’s leaders were found guilty of the crime of illegally
conspiring to raise their wages, effectively criminalizing unions
in Pennsylvania.10 The result of Pullis left the legal status of unions in question in other parts of the country, and there were at
least eighteen other instances of early union members being
prosecuted for conspiracy over the course of the next three
decades.11
It would not be until 1842 that a court would declare that
labor unions were in fact legal enterprises and not criminal conspiracies.12 That case, Commonwealth v. Hunt, coincidentally also
dealing with shoemakers, set the stage for the legality of collecNational Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–03.
7 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88.
8 Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165, 166–67 (1931).
9 3 Doc. Hist. 59 (Phila. Mayor’s Ct. 1806); Omar Swartz, Defending Labor in
Commonwealth v. Pullis: Contemporary Implications for Rethinking Community, 8
HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 80 n.10 (2004).
10 Id. at 80.
11 Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 826 (1926).
12 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 136 (1842).
5
6
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tive bargaining in the United States,13 and Chief Justice Shaw’s
majority opinion is widely regarded as “the Magna [Carta] of
American trade-unionism.”14 In Hunt, Chief Justice Shaw made
the distinction between the mere concept of a combination of
workers seeking to use collective bargaining to regulate their
wages—a union—and the methods a union might employ to secure higher wages or other protections.15 By drawing such a
line, Chief Justice Shaw reframed the debate from whether a
union itself amounted to an illegal conspiracy to whether the
objectives sought by the union and methods used to accomplish
such objectives were themselves legal.16 Though the debate over
the precise demarcation of when union action crosses into illegal territory continues to this day, Chief Justice Shaw’s formulation would prove highly influential, with only three conspiracy
cases in the subsequent twenty years brought against workers.17
Though Chief Justice Shaw laid the groundwork for the legality
of unions and their ability to strike lawfully, his opinion would
do little to stem oncoming tides of conflict between workers and
their employers in an increasingly industrial society.18
Strikes would prove to be the tool of choice for American
workers in combatting poor working conditions, low wages, and
overall governmental hostility to the interests of workers.19 The
tensions between workers and their employers came to a head in
1877, when workers—frustrated with repeated pay cuts, shouldering the burden of an economic depression, and the efforts of
employers to stifle the potency of unions—staged what would be
the first nationwide strike in American history, with estimates of
nearly 500,000 workers walking out from their jobs in July
1877.20 Characterized as the “Great Strike” or the “Great Insurrection,” the strikes of July 1877 began along America’s extensive railroad system.21 No longer constrained to a mere local
group of disgruntled shoemakers like the unions in Pullis and
Hunt, the Great Strike involved workers of the railroad corporaId.
LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
183 (1957).
15 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
16 Id.
17 LEVY, supra note 14, at 206.
18 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
19 MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, 1877: AMERICA’S YEAR FOR LIVING VIOLENTLY 144
(2010).
20 Id. at 145.
21 Id.
13
14
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tions—some of the largest and most influential corporations in
America at the time—the same corporations that played a critical role in America’s rapid industrialization.22
The increased stakes and heightened impacts of the railway
worker strikes resulted in an increase in the severity of the response—this time, rather than taking the striking unions to
court, corporate leaders resorted to force almost immediately.23
When local police forces and state militias—many of them holding sympathies to the cause of the striking workers24—were unable or unwilling to enact the will of corporate leaders, the
leaders turned to recently inaugurated President Rutherford B.
Hayes.25 Indebted to the corporate leaders who had supported
his presidential campaign, President Hayes authorized federal
troops to suppress the strikes—a rarely used option—and the
Great Strike marked the first time federal troops were used on a
nationwide scale to quash a strike.26
President Hayes’s decision to acquiesce to the demands of
railway corporations and authorize the use of federal force
would ultimately end the strikes, but not without bloodshed,27
destruction of property,28 and the garnering of much public
support for the unions.29 The victory of the corporations would
prove to be a Pyrrhic one, as the landscape of labor relations
had been forever changed.30 It had become clear to the workers
that they could not rely on the current governmental institutions to side with their interests over those of the wealthy railway
owners,31 and it had become clear to the nation’s elite that the
influence and power of a unified working class could have devastating results for the country.32
Responses to the new landscape were mixed; some industrialists raised wages in order to keep their workers happy and
loyal,33 while others like Andrew Carnegie saw only the dangerous aspects of unions and conditioned hiring workers on their
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

145–46.
145.
149.
146.
145–46.
175.
155–58.
156.
190.
179.
175.
168.
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agreement to not join one34—a practice that would later become known as a “yellow-dog contract.”35 Workers who had lost
faith in elected public officials turned to the ballot box in order
to secure their rights.36 And, having witnessed the existential
threat that a striking railway workforce imposes on the country’s
economy,37 it became imperative for the political leaders to prevent such a massive strike from occurring again. The federal
government’s early attempts to mediate the interests of the railway owners and workers would take place through a series of
failed legislation that ultimately culminated in the still extant
RLA in 1926.38
B. THE LEAD UP TO MODERN LAW GOVERNING AIRLINE
EMPLOYEES: BACKGROUND TO THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Still hot on the heels of the Great Strike of 1877, political
leaders in state governments had great incentive to encourage
harmonious resolution of disputes between unions and employers. To facilitate such resolution, several states began passing
legislation to arbitrate labor disputes as early as 1878, though
the state statutes ultimately proved to be feckless.39 However,
these statutes provided the groundwork for a federal statute’s
inception. Given the recent history of railway strikes and the railway industry’s susceptibility to such strikes, the impact those
strikes had on the national economy, and the fact that railways
were clearly engaged in interstate commerce, it is of little surprise that the first federal law on labor arbitration would arise in
the context of railway labor disputes.40 As a result, President
Grover Cleveland signed into law the Arbitration Act of 1888
(Arbitration Act), which provided an arena for voluntary arbitration of railway labor disputes.41 However, much like the previously ineffective state laws, voluntary arbitration failed to solve
the disagreements between the unions and railway owners: in
the Arbitration Act’s ten-year lifespan, voluntary arbitration was
Id. at 154.
Joel I. Seidman, The Yellow Dog Contract, 46 Q.J. ECON. 348, 348 (1932).
36 BELLESILES, supra note 19, at 187–88.
37 Id. at 175.
38 Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early
Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373, 386 (1983).
39 Id. at 380–81.
40 Id. at 382.
41 Id.; Arbitration Act of 1888, Pub. L. No. 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1888) (repealed 1898).
34
35
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not used once.42 The Arbitration Act’s requirement of impartial
and disinterested mediators, slow-moving bureaucracy, and inability to bring both sides to the table resulted in a wholly ineffective piece of legislation, which was quickly replaced.43
The Arbitration Act’s follow-up, the Erdman Act of 1898
(Erdman Act),44 sought to correct the deficiencies of the Arbitration Act.45 The Erdman Act removed the requirement of having impartial mediators and established a permanent
commission with the power to prevent strikes and firings during
an investigation.46 With the exception of a single failed attempt
to invoke an arbitration proceeding, the Erdman Act was not
used at all during the first eight years of its existence.47 But this
changed beginning in 1906, and it was invoked in sixty cases
from 1906 to 1913.48 The most important change was perhaps
the ability to appeal arbitration rewards to federal courts.49 Unfortunately, the increased use resulted in increased disapproval
of the Erdman Act, as decisions affecting millions of dollars and
thousands of workers were often made by an outside mediator
with little to no knowledge of the industry.50 Eventually, dissatisfaction with the mediators’ decisions led to both unions and railway leaders refusing to use the Act, and threats of an incoming
strike galvanized Congress to pass yet another version of the
bill.51
The 1913 edition of the legislation, the Newlands Labor Act
(Newlands Act),52 again sought to correct perceived deficiencies
in the previous versions, this time establishing a permanent
three-member board of remediation and conciliation utilizing
mediators from within the industry.53 This version received
more use than previous iterations, handling seventy-one disputes between 1913 and 1917, though it ran into an impasse in
1916 after unions asserted that their demand for an eight-hour
Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 382.
Id. at 383.
44 Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 1913).
45 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 383.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 383–84.
49 Id. at 385.
50 Id. at 384.
51 Id.
52 Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration Between Carriers and Employees,
ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (repealed 1926).
53 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 384–85.
42
43
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workday was not a question suitable for the three-member board
to resolve.54
With the threat of yet another strike mounting, Congress
passed the Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916 (Adamson Act),55
which established an eight-hour workday and overtime pay for
railway workers.56 Fervently contested by railway owners, the
Adamson Act was litigated all the way up to the Supreme Court,
and, in 1917, the Supreme Court upheld the ability of Congress
to regulate the workday and overtime compensation for interstate railway workers,57 a surprising change of pace for a Court
that had struck down New York’s attempt to limit the amount of
hours worked in a bakery to ten hours a day as unconstitutional
just twelve years prior.58
While the goings-on of the railway industry had largely been
an insular affair, in 1918, the mounting need for a nationally
unified railway entity due to the demands of World War I resulted in the nationalization of the railway industry under the
Railway Administration Act.59 The nationalization of the country’s railway system would last a few years, until 1920, when the
railways returned to private ownership.60 However, the relative
harmony in which railways operated for the years of nationalization signaled that improvements still could be made to the Newlands Act, and as a result, Congress passed yet another version,
the Transportation Act of 1920 (Transportation Act).61
The Transportation Act, however, largely regressed from the
improvements made in previous iterations, with both labor unions and railway executives seeking to replace the legislation.62
The Transportation Act mandated use of arbitration proceedings, but the decisions were ultimately toothless because they
were not legally enforceable.63 However, contrary to prior laws,
the Transportation Act was widely used, and the newly established board was inundated with nearly 14,000 cases over its fiveId. at 385.
Adamson Eight-Hour Act, Pub. L. No, 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1916) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 28301–02).
56 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
57 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1917).
58 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905).
59 Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 65-107, 40 Stat. 451 (1918) (repealed 1920); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
60 Id.
61 Id.; Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
62 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
63 Id. at 385.
54
55
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year lifespan.64 The dissatisfaction from both railway owners and
union officials led the parties to begin drafting their own version of the law, which was then proposed to Congress.65 That
version was ultimately passed in 1926 as the RLA.66
The RLA, further amended in 1934 to fix some deficiencies
and again in 1936 to include the airline industry within the Act’s
purview, remains the governing law over labor relations in both
the railway and airline industries to this day.67 The RLA governs
the handling of disputes within the industries, utilizing a single
organization, the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(Board).68 As a result of comprehensive negotiations, the RLA
contains significant concessions for both sides: labor unions
largely gave up their ability to strike without first going through
the Board, but gained the ability to sue employers in federal
court for violations of the RLA.69 The ability to bring suits for
violation of the RLA on their own volition distinguishes railway
and airline workers from most other employees in the country,
who are subject to the NLRA of 1935, which gives the National
Labor Relations Board exclusive standing to sue.70 This right is a
direct result of the long-fought history of railway workers in the
early stages of an industrializing United States.
While the 1934 amendments sought to correct several deficiencies of the original Act, the 1936 amendments were added
to extend the Act to the fledgling airline industry.71 The RLA
was extended to the airline industry for a myriad of reasons: similar to the railway industry, the airline industry dealt with interId.
Id. at 386.
66 Id.; Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88).
67 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
68 Id. at 387.
69 Id. at 387–88.
70 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended from time to
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 A. J. Harper II, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. & COM.
3, 3 (1969).
64
65
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state commerce, making it ripe for federal legislation, and the
airline industry had an immediate need for thorough and effective regulations, which the RLA could provide.72 By doing so, it
established uniformity between the industries.73 Additionally, by
1936, nearly every other facet of the airline industry was subject
to close regulation, and there was no compelling reason to exclude labor from the norm.74 However, while the RLA undoubtedly provided a much-needed framework at the industry’s
emergence, the airline industry has continued to be burdened
by a system that was not designed with its needs in mind.75 As
will be discussed in Part IV.A, the modern needs of the airline
industry have only exacerbated its growing pains within the
framework of the RLA, and either an amendment to existing
federal frameworks or a new statute is required to adequately
respond to the current landscape.
C.

NON-UNION LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS: THE RISE
FALL OF THE LOCHNER ERA

AND

While the development of the RLA was largely a fifty-year process of iterative legislation insulated from other labor developments in the United States, the modern rights of both railway
and airline workers are further enmeshed in a broader net of
protections, combining the RLA, Supreme Court precedent,
and other federal legislation such as the FLSA of 1938.
Around the same time that the Supreme Court upheld the
Adamson Act in 1917, limiting the working day of railway employees to eight hours, the Court had been consistently striking
down other extensions of protections to workers.76 Dubbed the
“Lochner era” after the Court’s ruling in Lochner v. New York
(striking down a state law limiting the working day to ten
hours), the Court’s decisions in this era were characterized by a
laissez-faire approach to the labor market.77 Strictly protecting
the principle that individuals were free to enter into contracts of
Id.
Id.
74 James B. Frankel, Judicial and Regulatory Decisions, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 461,
461–62 (1951).
75 Id. at 477–79.
76 See supra Part II.
77 Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1991).
72
73
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their choice, the Lochner Court rejected the idea of a “paternal
government” interfering with the liberty of contract.78
However, the Lochner era began on shaky ground, as it was not
fully supported by precedent, and it would be a mere three decades before the Lochner jurisprudence fully collapsed in 1937.79
The laissez-faire principles undergirding the Lochner era stood at
odds with an earlier ruling in Holden v. Hardy, which upheld regulations preventing individuals from contracting in ways that
harmed themselves.80 In fact, it would only be twelve years
before Lochner’s specific holding regarding the validity of maximum hours legislation would be overruled, though the pernicious logic behind its reasoning would persist.81 In Bunting v.
Oregon, the Court upheld a state law limiting the working day to
ten hours and providing time-and-a-half overtime for hours
worked past the limit, overruling the particular holding in
Lochner.82
Despite Bunting overturning Lochner, the era would continue
with some of its most notorious decisions in the years to come.
Just a year after Bunting, the Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting the sale of products made by child labor in interstate commerce in Hammer v. Dagenhart.83 The decision in Adkins
v. Children’s Hospital soon followed, where the Court struck
down another federal law providing protections for workers, this
time mandating a minimum wage for female employees in the
District of Columbia.84 Grasping at straws to distinguish the decision from that of Bunting, the Court focused on the difference
between laws regulating wages and those regulating hours as sufficient grounds to differentiate it from Bunting.85 The Lochner
era’s tenuous grasp of logic would soon lead to its downfall, and
the overruling of Adkins sounded the death knell of the era. In
1937, the Court heard yet another case regarding the minimum
wage, and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court struck the
killing blow to the Lochner jurisprudence and upheld a minimum wage.86
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 9.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 19–20, 19 n.78; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917).
247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560–61 (1923).
Id. at 550–51.
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
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With the looming threat of the Court striking down labor regulations finally over, hardly a year elapsed between the fall of
the Lochner era and the passage of a comprehensive set of federal labor regulations. The FLSA established a national base
level minimum wage, prohibited the employment of children,
capped the work week at forty-four hours, and provided timeand-a-half overtime pay on work past the cap—a monumental
expansion of worker protections, and one that President Franklin D. Roosevelt characterized as the most important piece of
New Deal legislation next to the Social Security Act.87 The FLSA
would be challenged shortly after on the grounds that it could
not proscribe child labor given the precedent of Hammer v.
Dagenhart, and the Supreme Court was given a chance to strike
down the FLSA. However, in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
the Court unanimously upheld the FLSA, abolishing the last vestiges of the Lochner era and overturning Hammer.88 While the
FLSA has been amended many times since its passage, the core
of the legislation nonetheless persists as the national bare minimum of worker rights and protections for employees engaged in
interstate commerce.
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Bolstered by both the RLA and the FLSA, in addition to applicable state and local laws, it would seem at first glance that airline workers must be some of the most protected workers in the
country. While airline workers benefit in some areas from the
years of collective labor bargaining that led to the passing of the
RLA, the RLA was written with railway workers in mind, and it
continues to be a poor fit for the airline industry. For employees
in the airline industry, the multi-jurisdictional nature of their
work, combined with conflicting state and local laws and the
lack of a uniform federal standard to preempt such laws, subjects airline workers to a confusing thicket of inconsistent laws
that can obfuscate their rights.

87 Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Dec. 2000, at 32, 32, 36; see also Jared Bernstein
& Ross Eisenbrey, Eliminating the Right to Overtime Pay, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 25,
2003), https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_flsa_jun03/ [https://
perma.cc/V49R-7LTK].
88 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).
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At odds with the age-old legal maxim of ubi jus ubi remedium
(where there is a right, there is a remedy),89 there can be no
remedy if a worker does not know that she has that right to begin with. Especially given the fact that federal legislation like the
RLA or FLSA merely sets out the bare minimum protections
that are often exceeded by state and local laws like California’s
wage and hour law90 or Washington’s Paid Sick Leave Act
(PSLA),91 an airline worker uncertain of her rights may in fact
end up with fewer protections than a worker who never leaves
the city or state and is certain of her rights.
A.

THE BARREN FIELD: A LACK

OF

CLEAR FEDERAL PREEMPTION

A critical issue for a worker in determining her rights is the
lack of clarity on what laws apply when and the overall absence
of unambiguous federal protections. On the whole for workers
outside of the airline industry, the lack of federal preemptive
standards tends to benefit workers given the bare minimum
standards presented in the federal statutes and the additional
protections workers receive through more comprehensive state
and local laws. Many states have passed higher wage and hour
rates than the FLSA base level, with twenty-nine states (plus
Washington, D.C., Guam, and the Virgin Islands) exceeding the
federal minimum wage.92 The ability of states to pass higher
standards was clearly an intentional feature of the FLSA and is
laid out in § 218(a) of the Act. Colloquially referred to as the
“savings clause,” the FLSA states that “[n]o provision of this Act
or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with
any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance” establishing a
higher minimum wage or shorter maximum work week.93 As has
been held by the Third Circuit, “the statute’s plain language
evinces a clear intent to preserve rather than supplant state law.”94
The savings clause allows states and local municipalities to ex89 Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 71, 78 n.47 (2001).
90 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090 (2020).
91 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
92 See Consolidated Minimum Wage Table, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.: WAGE & HOUR DIV.
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mw-consolidated [https://
perma.cc/5YX7-RP4X].
93 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
94 Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added); see also Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“According to § 218(a), . . . state law supersedes the collective bargaining
agreement.”).
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tend greater protections to workers in their jurisdiction than
would otherwise be available through the FLSA.
Though the RLA does not have a corollary to the savings
clause, the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that RLA
preemption “extends only as far as necessary to protect the role
of labor arbitration in resolving [collective bargaining agreement] disputes.”95 In line with this precedent, the RLA only
preempts state law when a state law claim arises entirely from or
requires construction of a collective bargaining agreement.96 As
such, the RLA does not preempt state law claims to enforce
rights independent of a collective bargaining agreement, such
as minimum labor standards.97
Since neither the FLSA nor the RLA preempt state law in the
vast majority of circumstances, this would ordinarily simplify the
analysis—a worker is subject to the standards in the RLA or
FLSA, then any standards in the state or municipality of her job
that exceed the federal baseline. However, this analysis is confounded when an employee does work in multiple jurisdictions,
such as an employee who spends most of her time working in
Dallas, Texas, but who attends a trade conference in Los Angeles, California. In that scenario, the labor laws of both Dallas
and Texas would apply to the worker as she does her work in
Dallas, but when she arrives in Los Angeles, she becomes subject
to the laws and protections of California and local laws of Los
Angeles. As the Supreme Court has held, “[a] basic principle of
federalism is that each state may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders.”98 This principle was upheld in Sullivan v. Oracle, where
the California Supreme Court held that the California Labor
Code’s overtime protections applied to work performed in California by out-of-state plaintiffs on short-term trips.99
However, dealing with airline employees who can potentially
cross hundreds of state borders in each pay period pushes this
scenario to its logical extreme, with potentially multiple different and conflicting labor standards applying to employees
95 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1445 (2019); see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,
512 U.S. 246, 262–64 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
413 (1988).
96 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2016).
97 Norris, 512 U.S. at 256.
98 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
99 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 241 (Cal. 2011).
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within a span of minutes. This issue is only confounded further
by states that then assert extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply
their wage and hours laws to workers who are neither residents
of the state nor employees of a resident employer. The RLA’s
inability to deal with this problem through federal preemption
only furthers the need to divorce the airline industry from this
outdated and ill-fitting piece of legislation.
B.

THE STICKY HAND: EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTION
WAGE AND HOURS LAWS

OF

STATE

Some states have begun to apply their wage and hour statutes
to employees who live or work outside of the state’s jurisdiction.
Unlike the FLSA, which expressly limits its application to work
performed within the United States and its territories,100 many
state wage and hour statutes hold no such geographic limitations. There have been four categories of these laws being applied extraterritorially to: (1) “out-of-state employees working
in-state for resident employers”; (2) “out-of-state employees
working out-of-state for resident employers”; (3) “resident employees working in-state for out-of-state employers”; and (4) “resident employees working out-of-state for resident employers.”101
First, in terms of laws being applied extraterritorially to out-ofstate employees working in-state for resident employers, California,102 Illinois,103 and Massachusetts104 have extended their protections to all instances of work performed in the state,
100

Id.

29 U.S.C. § 213(f).
Employment in foreign countries and certain United States territories: The provisions of sections 206, 207, 211, and 212 of this title
shall not apply with respect to any employee whose services during
the workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign country or within territory under the jurisdiction of the United States
other than the following: a State of the United States; the District of
Columbia; Puerto Rico; the Virgin Islands; outer Continental Shelf
lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . ; American Samoa; Guam; Wake Island; Eniwetok Atoll; Kwajalein Atoll;
and Johnston Island.

101 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Extraterritorial Application of State Wage
and Hours Laws, 29 A.L.R. 7th, art. 7 (2017).
102 Maez v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 04-00790 JSW, 2005 WL 1656908, at
*2, *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2005) (rejecting Defendant’s argument that California law was inapplicable); Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
103 Adams v. Catrambone, 359 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Illinois
law).
104 Dow v. Casale, 989 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
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regardless of the resident status of the employee. Second, for
out-of-state employees working out-of-state for resident employers, Kansas,105 Kentucky,106 and Washington107 have held that
their state wage and hour statutes may apply to protect employees who may never have even set foot in the state as long as their
employer was based in that state. Third, instances of resident
employees working in-state for out-of-state employers and having access to the wage and labor laws of the state have been
found in some capacity in Connecticut,108 Delaware,109 and
Massachusetts.110
The fourth category, and perhaps the most relevant category
for workers within the airline industry, deals with the extraterritorial assertion of wage and labor laws for resident employees
working out-of-state for a resident employer. So far, California,111 New York,112 Pennsylvania,113 and Washington114 have extended such rights in some capacity. Bernstein, out of the
Northern District of California, dealt precisely with the issue of
whether flight attendants, who are based in California but spend
only about a quarter of their time in the state, have access to the
broad protections provided by California’s wage and labor
laws.115 The court held that the workers fell under the protec105 Harlow v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226–27 (D. Kan.
2008) (applying Kansas law).
106 Himmelheber v. ev3, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-593-H, 2008 WL 360694, at *11
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2008) (applying Kentucky law).
107 Woods v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Line, Inc., No. 3304-6-II, 2008 WL 496803, at
*2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008).
108 Goldberg v. Goodwill Indus., No. CV054009642, 2006 WL 224124, at
*14–15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2006).
109 Redick v. E Mortg. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11-1260-GMS-CJB, 2013 WL 1089710,
at *1–2, *41–42 (D. Del. Mar. 15, 2013).
110 Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 409 (Mass. 2013).
111 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 1049, at 1055–56, 1063–64
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (applying California law); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 927 P.2d 296, 309 (Cal. 1996).
112 Heng Guo Jin v. Han Sung Sikpoom Trading Corp., No. 13-CV-6789 CBA
LB, 2015 WL 5567073, at *25–26 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015) (denying summary
judgment on Defendant’s extraterritoriality argument because “[n]either party
has briefed the choice of law analysis”).
113 Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL
2015126, at *10–11 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (noting that “[n]othing within the
language of the statute implies that work performed in a foreign country by a
Pennsylvania resident does not deserve the same protections as work performed
within Pennsylvania by the same resident and for the same company”).
114 Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc., 153 P.3d 846, 858 (Wash. 2007); Miller v. Farmer
Bros. Co., 150 P.3d 598, 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
115 Bernstein, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
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tion of California’s laws and rejected the idea that “job situs [is]
the dispositive factor to determine whether California’s wage
and hour laws apply.”116 This view, read in conjunction with the
California Supreme Court precedent coming out of Sullivan v.
Oracle, covers both those who are based in the state but perform
the majority of their work outside the state, and those based
outside the state who perform some work within the state.117
The holdings in Bernstein and Sullivan were reinforced in
Goldthorpe v. Cathay, which dealt with pilots who were based in
California but spent the majority of their time either in federal
airspace or outside the country.118 The court held that the pilots
were still under the protection of California’s wage and hours
laws, reasoning that there was:
no categorical rule that California’s wage and hour protections
can only apply if most of an employee’s work is performed within
the state, and the presumption against extraterritorial application does not prevent the application of California wage and
hour law to transportation workers based in California who travel
interstate. Absent such a categorical rule, and absent the presumption against extraterritorial application, it is difficult to
think of a reason why California law should not apply in this situation. After all, California’s wage and hour laws . . . were designed to protect workers, and to prevent employers from
exploiting their bargaining advantage by denying workers fair
wages and tolerable working conditions. Courts must construe
these laws “with an eye towards the purposes [they] were meant
to serve, and the type of person they were meant to protect.”119

While this bodes well for airline workers who live or frequently
work in California, what of airline workers across the country?
For airline workers in Washington, the question is much more
complicated, and they only receive the benefits of Washington’s
PSLA if they are a “Washington-based” employee.120 This is an
ad hoc determination and considers a multitude of factors such
as: (1) where the employment agreement was made; (2) the employee’s domicile; (3) the location of the employer’s base of operations; (4) the location of the employee’s base of operations;
Id. at 1059–60.
Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
118 Goldthorpe v. Cathay Pac. Airways, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1005 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
119 Id. at 1004–05 (internal citations omitted).
120 Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Wash. Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1162,
1168 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
116
117
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(5) whether the employer maintains a work site in Washington;
(6) whether the employee leaves Washington as part of the job;
(7) where work assignments come from; (8) where supervisors
are located; (9) the amount of work done in Washington; and
(10) the length of the contract to work in Washington.121
Though Washington is willing to give less weight to certain factors depending on the circumstances, e.g., “[f]or flight crew,
who do not spend very much time working in any one place,
[Washington Department of Labor & Industries] has indicated
that location of work is given less weight,” even a seemingly dispositive factor like being domiciled at a Washington airport
would not be enough to grant flight crew protections under the
law without satisfying other factors.122 Given the relative stringency of Washington’s determination for granting protections
compared to the leniency of California’s, it does not take much
to imagine a scenario in which an airline worker whose base of
operations is out of a Washington airport and who is a resident
of Washington, but whose employer is based out of California
and who frequently travels to California as a result, receives
much greater protections under California labor laws than those
of her own home state of Washington.
Thus arises the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction—
though California is seeking to increase the rights and protections of workers, the thought that an out-of-state domiciled and
working employee would have greater protections in California
than in her home state runs contrary to common sense. And a
right without the knowledge that one has it is hardly a right at
all.
Additionally, this confusion harms employers as well as employees. While employees may not know their rights, the only
thing they lose for that ignorance is their ability to exercise the
right. However, the stakes are much higher for airline corporations, who can rack up massive civil liability to their employees if
found to have violated provisions of either the FLSA or state
law.123 In the case of Bernstein, Virgin Airlines racked up over
$85 million in backpay and civil and statutory liabilities.124 Employers are stuck wading through the murk to try to figure out
Id.
Id.
123 E.g., John Petrick, Virgin America Calls Bid for $85M in Wage Case ‘Excessive’,
LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1102248 [https://
perma.cc/7SZM-6PN7].
124 Id.
121
122
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which laws are applicable to their employees, which quickly becomes a Sisyphean task as their workers may work in any number of states in a single pay cycle. The only recourse airlines have
against potential wage and hour violations would be to adopt
the highest standard of all the jurisdictions where they do business, which could become a financially ruinous undertaking.
C.

THE COVERAGE GAP: INADEQUACIES IN THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ACT

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on June 30, 1956, United Airlines
Flight 718 and Trans World Airlines Flight 2, both regularly
scheduled passenger flights to the Midwest, took off from Los
Angeles International Airport.125 A mere hour and a half later,
the two planes collided over the Grand Canyon, destroying both
aircraft and resulting in the deaths of all passengers and crew,
with 128 lives lost.126 Both pilots followed the existing protocol
and reported to communication stations that they would be flying over the Grand Canyon at the same altitude at the same
time, but the flight controller with that information was under
no obligation to inform the pilots of their impending crash
course.127 In the pre-FAA world, it was the responsibility of the
pilots alone to keep clear of other aircraft.128 This crash went
down in history as the deadliest commercial aviation collision at
the time and marked the first instance of a commercial airline
collision resulting in more than 100 deaths.129 However, the
deaths were not completely in vain, as public outrage over the
outdated and ineffective air traffic control system that resulted
in the crash would galvanize the creation of the Federal Aviation
Agency (later known as the FAA).130
NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., REP. NO. SA-320/1-0090 MIDAIR COLLISION, ACCIINVESTIGATION REPORT, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES LOCKHEED 1049A N6902C
AND UNITED AIR LINES DOUGLAS DC-7 N6324C, OVER THE GRAND CANYON, ARIZONA, JUNE 30, 1956, ¶¶ 2, 7 (1957), https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/
look.php?report_key=1251 [https://perma.cc/L3DP-QTAL].
126 Id. ¶ 1.
127 1956 Grand Canyon Airplane Crash a Game-Changer, CBS NEWS (July 8, 2014),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1956-grand-canyon-airplane-crash-a-gamechanger/ [https://perma.cc/N4XY-RF8P].
128 Id.
129 Grand Canyon Collision Declared a National Historic Landmark, GRAND CANYON
VISITOR CTR. (May 1, 2014), https://explorethecanyon.com/grand-canyon-collision-declared-a-national-historic-landmark/ [https://perma.cc/ZMV3-59HN].
130 Id.
125

DENT
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Just two years after the 1956 Grand Canyon collision, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (FAAct) into law.131 The FAAct’s purpose was to regulate
the safety and efficiency of the airways, providing a comprehensive series of regulations that covered most aspects of the airline
industry.132 The agency would later become known as the FAA
when it was consolidated into the Department of Transportation
(DoT) in 1967, and the FAA continues to be the governing body
for commercial airline regulation and standards.133
The field of airline safety was uniquely ripe for federal regulation because air travel takes place almost entirely within federal
jurisdiction, requires more coordination than any other form of
public transportation, and poses the largest risk to safety when
done carelessly.134 “Regulation on a national basis is required
because air transportation [itself] is a national operation.”135 As
the court in Montalvo held, “[t]he FAA, together with federal air
safety regulations, establish complete and thorough safety standards for interstate and international air transportation that are
not subject to supplementation by, or variation among,
states.”136 In other words, the FAA is used to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety—“[f]ield preemption occurs if federal law
‘thoroughly occupies’ the ‘legislative field’ in question, i.e., the
field of aviation safety. . . . Such a purpose properly may be inferred . . . where the federal interest in the field is sufficiently
dominant.”137 The Third Circuit succinctly summarized it as follows: “[F]ederal law establishes the applicable standards of care
in the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire
field from state and territorial regulation.”138 Despite the FAA’s
broad authority in the field of air safety, the administration is
entirely silent on the issue of wage and labor laws for employees
within its industry.

A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.
faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/#birth [https://perma.cc/9QAN-7B9V].
132 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, pmbl., 72 Stat. 731, 731 (1958).
133 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 131.
134 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 474.
137 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
138 Id.
131
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THE NEED FOR REFORM IN AIRLINE LABOR
LEGISLATION

In an industry where nearly every facet is now closely regulated on a federal level, the thicket of conflicting and confusing
law surrounding airline labor rights is truly an anomaly. This
Comment proposes adding federal legislation that would expressly preempt state wage and hour laws. The current system
fits poorly within the RLA, causes needless litigation, and obfuscates the rights of workers. A uniform legislative framework will
better provide for the needs of workers, increase the overall
safety of the industry, and minimize litigation between workers
and airlines over disagreements about pay and rights.
A.

TAKING

THE

TRAINING WHEELS OFF: THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
HAS OUTGROWN THE RLA

Though the RLA may have provided a useful legal framework
for the airline industry in the 1930s, changes in society, new
technological advancements, and the growth of the industry as a
whole have evinced a need for an updated legal framework tailored to the needs of the airline industry. Two critical factors
interfere with the RLA’s ability to serve the needs of the airline
industry: its bespoke past and its age.
Not only have there been massive changes to the industry in
the interim, but the 1936 amendment to the RLA bundled the
rights of airline workers into an act “designed by and for the
railroad industry.”139 As discussed in Part II, the RLA was the
particular product of half a century of railway strikes, negotiations between railway unions and owners, and legislative attempts to balance the interests of the parties, and the final draft
of the RLA itself was written by the railway unions and owners
together.140 The unique past of the RLA makes it especially unsuitable for application to a new industry, and whether it actually provided a benefit to the nascent aviation field is subject to
some controversy, as other transportation industries developed
labor protections without the need of specialized treatment like
the railroad industry.141 Because the RLA was drafted to deal
with the specific intricacies of railway labor relations, it contains
several oddities that were the result of concessions made in ne139 James B. Frankel, Airline Labor Policy: The Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18
J. AIR L. & COM. 461, 461 (1951).
140 Id. at 466–67.
141 Id. at 471.
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gotiations between unions and owners. For example, as early as
1952, commentators were concerned with the RLA’s inapplicability to a fledgling industry:
the lack of a remedial forum for both employees and employers
that can expertly administer the relationships intended by the
[RLA] and both interpret and enforce its provisions is a basic
weakness. . . . Such a framework would not seem to be conducive
to the development of the most sensible labor-management relations in a new and growing industry, however satisfactory in the
more stabilized railroad industry.142

Second, not only was the RLA drafted to deal specifically with
the railway industry, but it was drafted close to a century ago
with few amendments. The airline industry of the modern-day
shares little in common with its predecessor in 1936—it has
faced changing levels of regulation and deregulation, has encountered technological developments, and has struggled to
deal with bankruptcies and mergers.143 In addition, the impact
of the September 11th terror attacks permanently changed the
landscape of the airline industry, with air carriers being forced
to shoulder many of the costs of compliance with increased
safety regulations.144 These changes have reached the critical
point where “the RLA is no longer adequate to ensure protection for airline employees.”145
This is not a problem that is necessarily unique to the RLA—
the need to respond to changes in the rapidly evolving aviation
field spurred the Montreal Convention of 1999 (Montreal Convention). With striking similarities to the need to replace the
outdated RLA and standardize labor rights for workers throughout the country, the Montreal Convention supplanted the outdated Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Warsaw Convention) and
standardized the field of airline liability on international
flights.146 The Montreal Convention was an acknowledgement
that the concerns that faced the start of the airline industry in
the early twentieth century—at the Warsaw Convention, the
142 Malcolm A. Macintyre, The Railway Labor Act—A Misfit for The Airlines, 19 J.
AIR L. & COM. 274, 288 (1952).
143 Lisa Catherine Tulk, The 1926 Railway Labor Act and the Modern American
Airline Industry: Changes and Chaos Outline the Need for Revised Legislation, 69 J. AIR
L. & COM. 615, 627 (2004).
144 Id. at 628.
145 Id. at 645.
146 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air preamble, opened for signature May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S.
309.
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concern was limiting liability in order to foster growth of the
nascent industry147—were not the same concerns that faced the
present industry. For many of the same reasons that the RLA
needs to be updated or replaced, calls to ratify the Montreal
Convention over the Warsaw Convention focused on the present
system of fractured and disparate laws depending on the jurisdiction, and the ability of a uniform standard to “simplify, clarify
and expedite the fair resolution of [disputes].”148
And, much like the Warsaw Convention, the RLA’s inadequacies have led to a fractured field of law because there is no unifying authority. The RLA only preempts state law when a state law
claim arises entirely from or requires construction of a collective
bargaining agreement.149 As such, the RLA does not preempt
state law claims to enforce rights independent of a collective
bargaining agreement, such as minimum wage standards or sick
leave.150
Nearly a century old, the RLA simply cannot do enough to
support the modern-day aviation industry, and ought to be replaced. Part V proposes new legislation that would supplant the
RLA and bring the labor rights of workers in the aviation industry into the twenty-first century.
B.

THE INTERSECTION OF LABOR LAWS AND PASSENGER SAFETY:
INCREASED PROTECTIONS FOR AIRLINE WORKERS WILL
DIRECTLY TRANSLATE INTO INCREASED SAFETY
FOR PASSENGERS

The airline industry is uniquely situated as one of the most
closely regulated industries in the country, and the vast majority
of its operations are conducted within federal jurisdiction—the
airspace. Airlines are heavily regulated by the FAA, which was
formed in order to have a single, uniform system for regulating
airline safety after a series of fatal crashes between civilian and
military aircraft.151 The catastrophic impact of mismanaged
flights was the key impetus in forming the FAA, and the Supreme Court has characterized FAA regulations as striking “a
delicate balance between the safety and efficiency” of planes in
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
David E. Rapoport & Hans Ephraimson-Abt, A 73-Year Odyssey: The Time Has
Come for a New International Air Liability System, 2002 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y
22,151, 22,171 (2002).
149 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016).
150 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256 (1994).
151 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F. 3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007).
147
148
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the sky and maintaining protections for persons on the
ground.152 This delicate balance and the interdependence of
the safety of persons in the sky and on the ground justified the
requirement of a “uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the [FAAct] are
to be fulfilled.”153
However, one facet of airline safety has slipped through the
cracks and has not been regulated by the FAA—sick days and
vacation days of airline staff. While perhaps not what immediately comes to mind when one thinks of airplane safety—considering devices such as oxygen masks, parachutes, and chairs that
function as floatation devices—pilot fatigue represents “one of
the biggest threats to air safety.”154 Hardly a decade has passed
since the tragic crash of Continental Flight 3407 outside of Buffalo, New York in 2009.155 Fatigue was cited as a cause of the
crew’s failure to adequately respond to the rapidly declining
plane, which ended up stalling and plunging into a house—killing the pilots, flight attendants, all the passengers, and a man on
the ground—resulting in fifty deaths overall.156 While the odds
of a commercial flight crashing are extremely low, “figures show
that 80% are a result of human error, with pilot fatigue accounting for 15–20% of human error in fatal accidents.”157 In the accident report conducted on the crash, the National
Transportation Safety Board compared fatigue impaired performance with alcohol impairment:
[S]leep loss is at least as potent as ethanol in its performanceimpairing effects and two hours of sleep loss equates to a breath
ethanol concentration of approximately .05% . . . correlat[ing]
prolonged wakefulness with impairment, such that being awake
for 16 hours is equivalent to a .05 [blood alcohol content].158

Despite the clear link between crew fatigue and increased risk of
harm, the FAA has not stepped in to guarantee sufficient time
152 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39
(1973).
153 Id. at 639.
154 Keith Moore, Pilot Fatigue ‘One of the Biggest Threats to Air Safety’, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-19837178 [https://
perma.cc/85FJ-4FFE].
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAR-10/01, PB2010-910401, ACCIDENT
REPORT, LOSS OF CONTROL ON APPROACH COLGAN AIR, INC. OPERATING AS CONTINENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407, at 3 (2009).
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off for airline crews. This leaves states and municipalities to fight
with airline corporations over the amount of leave allowed.
Dispute over Washington’s PSLA centered around this concern.159 In addition to the risk presented by fatigue, the district
court in Washington also considered how the airline’s unforgiving time-off policies led to the increased spread of germs, as
“flight attendants have attested to working while sick to avoid
acquiring [demerits].”160 This led to “research show[ing] that
flight attendants’ interactions with passengers make them both
the most likely source and recipient of disease on flights.”161
And, in past attempts to alleviate this problem during the 2009
H1N1 “Swine flu” outbreak, the Association of Flight Attendants
(AFA) raised concerns with the FAA and the House Subcommittee on Aviation that airline carriers should be required to “allow
flight attendants with flu-like symptoms themselves to call in sick
without risk of discipline.”162 The AFA turned to seeking federal
intervention due to its concern that “airline management [was]
more concerned with the appearance of flight attendants than
with the health of the public and the flight crew.”163 Without a
definite federal standard to guarantee labor protections for
workers, history has shown that airline carriers will sacrifice the
health of passengers and crew if it benefits their bottom line.
In Washington, though the airlines described being forced to
comply with the PSLA as an unreasonable burden, evidence
from when airlines were first subjected to New York City’s
Earned Sick Time Act (ESTA), which has similar provisions to
the Washington law, showed that “for the first two years after
Virgin began complying with ESTA, cabin crew delays only increased by .16 percentage points, an amount that is almost irrelevant compared to the Airlines’ overall delay rates of 15 to 20
percent.”164 With empirics showing that the airlines’ argument
of the unreasonable burden to comply was without merit, the
Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Washington Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d
1162, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
160 Id. at 1177.
161 Id.
162 Courtney Clegg, The Aviation Industry and the Transmission of Communicable
Disease: The Case of H1N1 Swine Influenza, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 460–61 (2010)
(citing Aviation Consumer Issues: Emergency Contingency Planning and Outlook for
Summer Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 22–24 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. Friend, International President, AFA)).
163 Id. at 461.
164 Air Transp. Ass’n Am., 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1176.
159
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court in Washington held that airline workers were under the
protection of its PSLA.165 This same debate rages on in New
York City over the city’s ESTA, as both Delta166 and American
Airlines167 fight against complying with it.
Without federal intervention through legislation, airline carriers have shown they will continue putting the health and safety
of crew, passengers, and people on the ground at risk. Airline
carriers will go to any measure to maximize profits at the cost of
safety with no hesitation. The FAA is primed to combat this type
of profit-over-safety mindset, and a congressional grant of authority to amend Title 49 to include some sort of provision in
line with either Washington’s PSLA or New York’s ESTA would
end the debate over the amount of leave given to workers, increase safety, decrease the spread of germs, and combat the issue of pilot fatigue.
C. NAVIGATING THE MAZE: THE CURRENT THICKET OF
CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTING STATE AND LOCAL
LAW RESULTS IN NEEDLESS LITIGATION COSTS
The litigation in Bernstein is a quintessential example of litigation as deadweight loss—an economic term describing an inefficient allocation of resources that results in a cost to society as a
whole.168 That is to say, it is a needless waste of time, money, and
judicial economy. Embroiled in a multi-year class action wage
lawsuit with its former flight attendants for failure to pay for all
hours worked, overtime or provide accurate wage statements,
and waiting time penalties to discharged employees, Virgin Airlines (Virgin) continued to rack up costs as it (1) paid its own
legal fees; (2) was sanctioned to pay the legal fees of the class
action plaintiffs as a result of its misconduct in discovery;169 and,
ultimately, (3) paid approximately $77 million to members of
the class—nearly double from the starting amount of $45.4 milId. at 1177.
Linda Cheim, NYC Insists Paid Sick Leave Law Doesn’t Harm Delta, LAW360
(May 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1269513 [https://perma.cc/
K9NF-NGKZ].
167 Reenat Sinay, American Airlines Challenges NYC Paid Sick Leave Law, LAW360
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184444/american-airlineschallenges-nyc-paid-sick-leave-law [https://perma.cc/Z7WH-9KFQ].
168 Alicia Tuovila, Deadweight Loss, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 24, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deadweightloss.asp [https://perma.cc/4D4VW9P5].
169 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., No. 15-cv-02277-JST, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
201712, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018).
165
166
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lion in damages and restitution for wage and hour violations as a
result of civil and statutory penalties.170 And while these costs
were mostly avoidable—namely, if Virgin had paid its employees
legally, or at the least complied in the discovery process—Virgin
ultimately will not be the party responsible for paying the fees,
as that cost gets passed on to society through increased costs to
consumers.
While it is certainly plausible that Virgin was genuinely mistaken as to the correct amount to pay its flight attendants who
worked in California as a result of the thicket of overlapping and
conflicting law discussed in Part III.B, that does not excuse the
bad faith dealing the business engaged in over the course of the
lawsuit. However, in a world with a clear, uniform, federally preemptive statute instead of the hodgepodge of state regulations,
this lawsuit may have not existed at all. Virgin is far from the first
corporation embroiled in a suit like this, however—wage and
hour class action suits are an increasingly common tool for low
wage employees to fight back against predatory employers and
are by far the most common type of class action claim filed in
federal court.171 In 2017, employers paid out over $1.2 billion in
wage and hour lawsuits,172 and while Virgin’s $77 million judgment may seem like a paltry amount in comparison to the total,
it represents nearly one-fifteenth of the total amount paid out by
all employers across the country that year.
Federally preemptive legislation can be used to stem the increasing tide of wage and hour class action lawsuits. With a clear
and national uniform standard, employers are aware of the exact amount that will be owed to each employee without having
to figure out the different wage and hour calculations for employees in each state. And, under a clear and uniform standard,
employees know exactly how much they should be earning, allowing them to monitor their income for discrepancies and notify their employer as soon as a discrepancy is noticed, thereby
alleviating the need for massive class-action lawsuits. Increased
information would only serve to benefit both parties, more effi170 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 980, 985, 993 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
171 Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2009).
172 Wage and Hour Claims: 2018’s Top Litigation Risk For Employers, THATCHER L.
FIRM BLOG (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.thatcherlaw.com/blog/2018/02/wageand-hour-claims-2018s-top-litigation-risk-for-employers.shtml [https://perma.cc/
V2MR-X5PY].
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ciently putting wages back in the workers’ pockets to begin with,
saving employers money that would otherwise go to fighting
wage-and-hour class actions, and keeping price lower for consumers as a result.
V.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TITLE 49

This Comment proposes an amendment to Title 49, which
governs transportation laws, establishes the DoT,173 and is the
current source of the FAA’s authority.174 Given the FAA’s wide
control of all aspects of aviation safety, and the massive safety
implications of labor standards in the industry, as discussed in
Part IV.B, an amendment to Title 49 will solve the current gap
in the FAA’s coverage of safety regulations. Placing labor under
the ambit of Title 49 falls squarely within its policy goal of “assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the
highest priorities in air commerce.”175 This Comment proposes
adding a new chapter to Title 49 (Transportation), Subtitle VII
(Aviation Programs), Subpart III (Safety). The following proposed amendment is modeled after Washington’s PSLA,176 with
modifications made to align it with the language in Title 49.
Chapter 455—Paid Sick Leave (§§ 45501–45504)
§ 45501. Paid Sick Leave—Every air carrier177 must provide
each of its airmen178 or flight attendants179 paid sick leave as
follows:
173 49 U.S.C. §§ 101–727. Subtitle I of Title 49 establishes the DoT, its goals,
and its duties. Id.
174 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–50105. Subtitle VII of Title 49 sets out regulations for
the aviation industry. Id.
175 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1).
176 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
177 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (defining “air carrier” as “a citizen of the United
States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air
transportation.”).
178 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(8). Title 49 defines “airman” as
an individual—
(A) in command, or as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew,
who navigates aircraft when under way;
(B) except to the extent the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may provide otherwise for individuals
employed outside the United States, who is directly in
charge of inspecting, maintaining, overhauling, or repairing
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; or
(C) who serves as an aircraft dispatcher or air traffic controltower operator.
Id.
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(a) An airman or flight attendant accrues at least one hour of
paid sick leave for every forty hours worked as an airman
or flight attendant. An air carrier may provide paid sick
leave in advance of accrual provided that such front-loading meets or exceeds the requirements of this section for
accrual, use, and carryover of paid sick leave.
(b) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for the following reasons:
(1) An absence resulting from an airman’s or flight attendant’s mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; to accommodate the airman’s or flight attendant’s need for medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or an airman’s or flight attendant’s need
for preventive medical care;
(2) To allow the airman or flight attendant to provide
care for a family member with a mental or physical
illness, injury, or health condition; care of a family
member who needs medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or care for a family member who needs
preventive medical care; and
(3) When the airman’s or flight attendant’s place of business has been closed by order of a public official for
any health-related reason, or when an airman’s or
flight attendant’s child’s school or place of care has
been closed for such a reason.
(c) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for absences as a result of domestic violence as
defined in Title 34 of the United States Code.180
179 9 U.S.C. § 44728(g) (defining “flight attendant” as “an individual working
as a flight attendant in the cabin of an aircraft that has twenty or more seats and
is being used by an air carrier to provide air transportation.”).
180 See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(a)(8).
The term “domestic violence” includes felony or misdemeanor
crimes of violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares
a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has
cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, by a
person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiving grant monies, or by any other person against an adult or youth victim who is
protected from that person’s acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction.
Id.
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(d) An airman or flight attendant is entitled to use accrued
paid sick leave beginning on the ninetieth calendar day
after the commencement of his or her employment.
(e) Air carriers are not prevented from providing more generous paid sick leave policies or permitting use of paid
sick leave for additional purposes.
(f) An air carrier may require airmen or flight attendants to
give reasonable notice of an absence from work, so long
as such notice does not interfere with an airman or flight
attendant’s lawful use of paid sick leave.
(g) For absences exceeding three days, an air carrier may require verification that an airman or flight attendant’s use
of paid sick leave is for an authorized purpose. If an air
carrier requires verification, verification must be provided to the air carrier within a reasonable time period
during or after the leave. An air carrier’s requirements
for verification may not result in an unreasonable burden
or expense on the airman or flight attendant and may not
exceed privacy or verification requirements otherwise established by law.
(h) An air carrier may not require, as a condition of an airman or flight attendant taking paid sick leave, that the
airman or flight attendant search for or find a replacement worker to cover the hours during which the airman
or flight attendant is on paid sick leave.
(i) For each hour of paid sick leave used, an airman or flight
attendant must be paid the greater of the minimum
hourly wage rate established in this chapter or his or her
normal hourly compensation. The air carrier is responsible for providing regular notification to airmen or flight
attendants about the amount of paid sick leave available
to the airman or flight attendant.
(j) Unused paid sick leave carries over to the following year,
except that an air carrier is not required to allow an airman or flight attendant to carry over paid sick leave in
excess of forty hours.
(k) This section does not require an air carrier to provide financial or other reimbursement for accrued and unused
paid sick leave to any airman or flight attendant upon the
airman or flight attendant’s termination, resignation, retirement, or other separation from employment. When
there is a separation from employment and the airman or
flight attendant is rehired within twelve months of separa-
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tion by the same air carrier, whether at the same or a different business location of the air carrier, previously
accrued unused paid sick leave must be reinstated and
the previous period of employment must be counted for
purposes of determining the airman or flight attendant’s
eligibility to use paid sick leave under subsection
45501(d) of this section.
§ 45502. Family Member Defined—For purposes of this chapter,
“family member” means any of the following:
(a) A child, including a biological, adopted, or foster child,
stepchild, or a child to whom the airman or flight attendant stands in loco parentis, is a legal guardian, or is a de
facto parent, regardless of age or dependency status;
(b) A biological, adoptive, de facto, or foster parent, stepparent, or legal guardian of an airman or flight attendant or
the airman or flight attendant’s spouse or registered domestic partner, or a person who stood in loco parentis
when the airman or flight attendant was a minor child;
(c) A spouse;
(d) A registered domestic partner;
(e) A grandparent;
(f) A grandchild; or
(g) A sibling.
§ 45503. Limitations on Policies—An air carrier may not
adopt or enforce any policy that counts the use of paid sick leave
time as an absence that may lead to or result in discipline
against the airman or flight attendant.
§ 45504. Air Carrier Retaliation—An air carrier may not discriminate or retaliate against an airman or flight attendant for
his or her exercise of any rights under this chapter including the
use of paid sick leave.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The lack of a clear and consistent federal standard across the
country harms both airline carriers and aviation employees—
carriers as they grapple with a myriad of regulations and airline
employees who are unsure of their rights and how to exercise
them. There is a clear need for an updated federal framework
that takes into account the airline industry and the needs of
workers in the present day; the RLA served its purpose in stabilizing the nascent airline industry in the 1930s, but the aviation
industry has outgrown its usefulness. To replace the RLA and
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standardize the labor rights of workers in the aviation industry,
this Comment proposes amending Title 49 to include a chapter
on labor. Because of the direct impact of the labor rights of airline workers on the safety of the aviation industry, legislation
dealing with these rights falls squarely within the purview of the
FAA. Through the proposed amendment, the aviation industry
will be made safer, workers will receive greater protections, and
the squandering of judicial economy through needless litigation
over the thicket of conflicting local, state, and federal law will
cease.
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